The Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command and the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense have conducted a ground test of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.

MDA said Monday the 12-day test dubbed GTD-06 Part 2 involved simulated threat scenarios to assess how BMDS will react during an actual attack.

GTD-06 Part 2 will support plans to increase fielding of ground-based interceptors from 30 to 44 in 2017 as well as the integration of an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communications System Data Terminal into the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.

IDT’s goal was to facilitate communications between the GMD fire control nodes and the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle.

The test involved ballistic missile defense components such as:

• GMD system
• AN/TPY-2 radars
• Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communication system
• Upgraded Early Warning Radars
• Cobra Dane radar
• Terminal High Altitude Area Defense weapon system
• Patriot weapon system
• Sea Based X-Band radar
• Space-Based Infrared System

MDA carries out regular ground tests to help the agency and combatant commanders assess the current system, develop missile defense doctrine and train operators.

The Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency has joined the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and rebranded to the name of Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization in accordance with the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act.

DTRA said Monday it has worked with JIDO on the transition since December 2015 to help both organizations support frontline warfighters and address both weapons of mass destruction and improvised explosive devices that terrorists seek to use.

“While we may have different focus areas, both our missions have some overlapping customers, threats and networks,” said Shari Durand, DTRA acting director.

“As we start the learning process and understand more what each organization is doing that’s when I think the greatest capabilities and the greatest synergy will come, and that will benefit the warfighter tremendously.”

DTRA expects the transition of JIDO to foster mission collaboration and work to offer efficiencies over time through the integration of offices in management areas such as human resources, security and counterintelligence, financial management, contracts, facilities and logistics management.

News surfaced in February that JIDA would integrate into DTRA as part of NDAA language that that requires the former to be moved by the Defense Department under the supervision of an existing defense agency or a military department.

Rear Adm. Jon Hill, program executive officer for integrated warfare systems at the U.S. Navy, has been appointed deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Department announced Friday.

As PEO IWS, he has managed programs to develop, sustain and deliver surface ship combat control systems, radars, missiles, launchers, electronic warfare and naval gunnery systems and surface and subsurface anti-submarine warfare mission systems to the Navy.

He previously worked at MDA as technical director of the Aegis ballistic missile defense initiative, major program manager for Aegis combat systems and director of cruiser and destroyer combat systems.

Hill also held leadership and acquisition engineering positions at the Navy’s AEGIS Shipbuilding project office, Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, NSWC Port Hueneme Division and PEO Theater Surface Combatants.

He also served as chief of staff to the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy and a senior fellow on the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group.

The Government Accountability Office has recommended the Food and Drug Administration fully implement an agency-wide information security program and take 166 specific actions to address gaps in information security controls.

GAO said in a report published Thursday the FDA has taken steps to protect seven GAO-reviewed systems that might jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and systems.

Auditors noted the FDA did not fully or consistently implement access controls designed to prevent, limit and detect unauthorized access to computing resources and 87 information security weaknesses were identified on access controls, configuration management, contingency planning and media protection.

GAO added the FDA did not protect boundaries of its network, identify and authenticate system users, limit user access, encrypt sensitive data, audit and monitor system activity or conduct physical security reviews on its facilities.

The watchdog cited control weaknesses as a product of a failure to implement an FDA-wide information security program required under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.